National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff Barriers by Jackson, John H.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 10 Issue 1 
1989 
National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff Barriers 
John H. Jackson 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff Barriers, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (1989). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol10/iss1/19 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NATIONAL TREATMENT OBLIGATIONS
AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
John H. Jackson*
INTRODUCTION
For most of the world, International Trade is governed - or
guided if "governed" is too strong a term - by a complex set of inter-
national treaties and institutions centering on the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). This set of treaties and institutions
(there are more than 150 treaty instruments)' is part of a broader
structure sometimes called the "Bretton Woods System," an arrange-
ment put in place at the end of World War II, partly by the Bretton
Woods Conference of 1944, and followed up by a series of conferences
and negotiations in the late 1940s. The GATT itself was never in-
tended to become what it is now. Instead, the countries involved in
structuring the post World War II economic system originally pre-
pared a draft charter for an International Trade Organization
("ITO"). This was completed at the Havana Conference in 1948. The
GATT (as part of the ITO system) was intended merely to be a recip-
rocal agreement for the mutual reduction of tariffs. As is generally
well known, the ITO failed to come into existence largely because the
United States Congress refused to approve the Havana Charter. As a
consequence, the GATT itself had to fill the vacuum, and has evolved
into the principal international trade organization of the non-commu-
nist world.2
The GATT contains a number of obligations, some of which have
been further elaborated through separate treaty instruments often
called "codes." A principal obligation of the GATT is the "tariff
binding" which sets a maximum tariff rate for massive lists of prod-
ucts, accepted in "tariff schedules" by each of the Contracting Parties
© 1989 John H. Jackson.
* Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This article is
drawn from a manuscript for a book concerning international trade policy and law, including
aspects of the United States Law and of the GATT Treaty bearing on international trade (M.I.T.
Press, forthcoming).
1. See generally CONTRACTING PARTIES TO GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD]. For the text of the General Agreement, see BISD vol. 4
(1969). For texts of the MTN Agreements concluded during the Tokyo Round, see BISD at 26
Supp. (1986).
2. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969) (in particular Chapters
1 and 2).
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(member nations) to GATT. Over the 40 year history of GATT, there
have been seven major trade negotiating rounds, mostly concerned
with negotiating the tariff bindings. In September 1986, a major new
(the eighth) trade negotiation was launched by the GATT at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, and that negotiation is now "in full stride."
In addition to the tariff bindings, the GATT has a number of rules
concerning the way nation members can apply their regulations for
governing trade which crosses their borders. Two GATT articles in
particular deal with principles of "nondiscrimination." One of these,
article I, is the famous "MFN - Most Favored Nation" clause, essen-
tially a principle of nondiscrimination as among nations of GATT.3
The other, article III, is the "National Treatment" article, which calls
for the principle of nondiscrimination to be applied as between goods
imported into a GATT member and goods produced domestically
within that GATT member. In this article, we will explore the second
of these two nondiscrimination principles - namely, the rules and ob-
ligations of "national treatment" in the context of GATT and some of
its "side codes".
The national treatment obligation is one of the most important and
also one of the most contentious of the GATT trading system. It has
the potential of affecting a large number of internal regulations and
government measures in any country, thus treading on national sover-
eignty and sensitivities, ranging from the way a country governs its
environment protection, consumer protection, food and drug meas-
ures, safety measures, to tax laws, etc. Consequently, it is not surpris-
ing that the national treatment obligation has been the subject of a
large number of contentious dispute cases (handled under a special
procedure in GATT described in other works).4
This article explores the national treatment obligation of GATT,
explains some of its difficult applications, and analyzes how the obliga-
tion has been affected by some of the agreements completed in the
Tokyo Round of negotiations (1973-1979).
I. THE POLICIES AND HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
TREATMENT OBLIGATION
Whereas MFN requires equal treatment among different nations,
3. See Jackson, Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law (XI): The Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 37 Y.B. INT'L TRADE 224 (1983).
4. See Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the
Context of GAIT, 13 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1979); Jackson, Strengthening the International
Legal Framework of the GA IT-MTN System: Reform Proposals for the New GATT Round, in
THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ASPECTS (1987).
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the national treatment obligation5 requires the treatment of imported
goods (once they have cleared customs and border procedures) to be
no worse than for domestically produced goods. Obviously an impor-
tant policy behind this rule is to prevent domestic tax and regulatory
policies from being used as a protectionist measure that would defeat
the purpose of tariff bindings. It should be noted, however, that this
obligation applies to all products, not just to bound products. Thus,
this rule assists the general goal of reducing restraints on imports.
A "national treatment" obligation can be found in many treaties,
some dating back to earlier centuries. 6 The scope of the obligation
may vary from treaty to treaty, however, and may apply to various
activities, not only to products. For example, a common application
of national treatment obligations is to criminal procedures when used
for foreign citizens. Another example is national treatment obliga-
tions for the "right of establishment," so that a foreign business can set
up branches and offices in another country. 7
The national treatment obligation is often a source of complaint or
dispute among nations.8 Since it refers to domestic regulatory and tax
measures, it is intimately related to various governmental measures
which are based on legitimate policy reasons not necessarily designed
for purposes of restraining imports. In some cases the domestic meas-
ures will overreach or be shaped to restrain imports significantly and
unnecessarily. In other cases, legitimate policy goals - including
those mentioned in the article on General Exceptions to GATT (Arti-
cle XX) - will prevent a measure from being inconsistent with GATT
obligations. 9 The temptation of legislators and other government offi-
cials to shape regulatory or tax measures so as to favor domestic prod-
5. GATT, Art. III, BISD vol. 4 (1969); see J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at ch. 12; J. JACKSON &
W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS ch. 8 (1986).
6. See P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 16-21 (1981), noting that nondiscrimination clauses (in the sense of national
treatment) were developed as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially in the
Hansa context. U.S. FCN treaties with a national treatment clause included Reciprocal Trade
Agreement with Iceland, Aug. 27, 1943, Art. II, 57 Stat. 1075, EA.S. No. 342; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Consular Rights with Finland, Feb. 13, 1934, Art. VII, 49 Stat. 2659, T.S.
No. 868; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights with Germany, Dec. 8, 1923,
Art. VIII, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. 725.
7. The right of establishment is a critical concern with respect to the provision of services
(although it may be important with respect to trade in goods). As such, the right of establish-
ment is an important issue in the service negotiations in the Uruguay Round. See J. ARONSON &
P. COWHEY, TRADE IN SERVICES: A CASE FOR OPEN MARKETS 25-26 (1984).
8. Our rough calculations indicate that of the 233 disputes formally brought to GATT, 31
concern Article II. See list of some of these disputes in R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 275 (1975); J. JACKSON supra note 2, at §§ 12.3-12.4; J. JACK-
SON & W. DAVEY, supra note 5, at 486-96.
9. See the author's forthcoming book, § 9.3.
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ucts seems to be very great, and proposals to do this are constantly
suggested.10 This clash of policies raises the broader issue of whether
a "harmonization" or "interface" approach is to be preferred."
II. THE CONTOURS AND APPLICATION OF
THE GATT OBLIGATION
Article III of GATT sets out the national treatment obligation per-
taining to treatment of imported products. The first paragraph is a
general statement of policy but includes an important phrase obligat-
ing Contracting Parties to refrain from using taxes or regulations "so
as to afford protection to domestic production."' 12
The second paragraph of Article III requires that internal taxes on
imported products shall not be in excess of those applied to domestic
goods, and expressly refers to the general goal of paragraph 1. The
fourth paragraph of this article imposes essentially the same obligation
with respect to regulations and other "requirements affecting ... [the]
internal sale. . ." of imported products. Paragraphs 5 and 7 prohibit
the use of mixing requirements to favor domestic products. Other
paragraphs, however, provide some exceptions to the general national
treatment rule, the most notable of which is the exception for govern-
ment purchases. 13
A 1958 dispute panel report involving Italian government meas-
ures relating to the sale of tractors provides a fundamental interpreta-
tion for the national treatment clause. In this case the United
Kingdom complained about an Italian banking measure that provided
more favorable loans to farmers buying domestically made tractors
than to farmers buying imported tractors. The panel report, accepted
by the Contracting Parties, '4stated, ". . . the intent of the drafters was
to provide equal conditions of competition once goods had been
cleared through customs. . . " and particularly stressed the fact that
the assistance by the State was not given to producers but to the
purchasers of agricultural machinery ....
Thus, once the imported goods have entered the internal stream of
10. The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community has a parallel pro-
vision to GATT Article 111:2 (Article 95), and this is one of the more frequently invoked provi-
sions of the Treaty in cases before the European Court of Justice.
11. See the author's forthcoming book, chs. 10, 14.
12. See J. JACKSON, supra note 2, at § 12.3; see also J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 5,
at §§ 8.1-8.2.
13. For a discussion of this issue, see infra section VI. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT.
14. Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Report by the Panel,
GATT, BISD, 7 Supp. 60, para. 13 (1959).
15. Id. at para. 5.
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commerce, no government regulatory measure should assist the
purchase of the domestic goods without likewise doing the same for
imported goods. Even though the domestic producer could be subsi-
dized under the GATT rules (including an explicit exception for such
subsidy in paragraph 8a of Article III of GATT), when the subsidy
had the effect of directly influencing the purchaser's choice, it was in-
consistent with the GATT.
The problem of "domestic content" rules has been troublesome.
As a condition of certain regulatory or license permissions such as
might be required in order to build a new factory or invest in a coun-
try, some nations have required formal or informal commitments that
products produced in the new plant or assembled from imported parts
be comprised of a certain minimum percent of domestic "value ad-
ded." The United States brought a complaint against the Canadian
government "FIRA" legislation (Foreign Investment Review Act)
partly on these grounds, arguing a violation of GATT Article III.4
and 5. The U.S. argued that the necessity of a commitment to the
purchase of Canadian goods where "competitively available" or other-
wise from Canadian suppliers as a requirement for investing in Canada
infringed GATT Article III.4. The Panel report in 1984 supported
this view even when the requirement was "informal."16
A separate complaint was made by the Canadians against a United
States law, known as "Section 337," and practice under it.17 This law
provides a procedure whereby an American industry can complain
about "unfair trade practices" of foreign parties shipping goods to the
U.S. market. These practices might be infringement of copyright or
patents, attempts to monopolize, etc. The Canadians alleged that the
Section 337 procedure, when compared to similar U.S. domestic pro-
cedures for attacking unfair trade practices (through the FTC, Federal
Trade Commission, or through patent or copyright domestic proce-
dures), in effect discriminated against imports. A 1983 GATT Panel
report concluded' 8 that GATT Article XX general exceptions, which
allowed "necessary" differences in treatment of imports in order to
secure compliance with patent, copyright, and certain other laws, was
applicable. The report then went on to determine whether the 337
measures were either a "disguised restriction on international trade"
or an "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" and concluded that
16. Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Report of the Panel,
GATT, BISD, 30 Supp. 140 (1984).
17. See the author's forthcoming book, § 10.7.
18. United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, Report of the Panel,
GATT, BISD, 30 Supp. 107 (1984). See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 5, at 519-22.
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they were neither. The report, however, did not give the Section 337
an entirely clean bill of health, noting that, in cases with different
facts, it could not exclude the possibility that "there might be cases...
where a procedure before a United States court might provide ... an
equally satisfactory and effective remedy ....
In an action brought under the so-called "New Commercial Policy
Instrument," Akzo, a Dutch supplier of high-technology fibers, com-
plained to the European Commission concerning a section 337 ban
requested by the U.S. company DuPont.20 The section 337 action al-
leged infringement by Akzo of patents held in the U.S. by DuPont.
The EC brought a GATT Panel proceeding arguing that Section 337
subjected imported goods to a separate and distinct procedure by vir-
tue of their non-U.S. origin. Further, they argued, such discrimina-
tion could not be justified as "necessary" under Article XX(d) of the
GATT. As of mid-1988 the panel had not reported.
III. DE FACTO OR IMPLICIT DISCRIMINATION
One of the more difficult conceptual problems of GATT rules is
the application of the national treatment obligation in the context of a
national regulation or tax which on its face appears to be non-discrimi-
natory, but because of Various circumstances of the market place or
otherwise, has the effect of tilting the scales against the imported prod-
ucts. As sophistication about GATT rules has increased among vari-
ous national officials, the number of these "implicit discrimination"
cases seems to increase.
A classic example of this situation occurred in U.S. taxation of
alcoholic beverages. A U.S. law (predating GATT and therefore bene-
fiting from grandfather rights) provided for a tax of $10.50 on "each
proof gallon or wine gallon when below proof." This taxing phrase
applied to domestically produced alcoholic beverages as well as im-
ported ones. A wine gallon is simply a gallon of the beverage, no mat-
ter how dilute the alcohol. A "proof gallon," however, is a gallon of
liquid which is 100 proof or 50% alcohol by volume. If a producer
can have his liquid taxed while at full proof, then later when the liquid
is diluted to the percent of alcohol used in the beverage sold at retail
(e.g., 86 proof or 43% for certain whiskies) the effective tax per gallon
of liquid sold at retail is $9.03, rather than $10.50. Domestic produ-
cers were able to achieve this. Their concentrated whisky was kept in
19. Panel Report, supra note 18, para. 66.
20. See Denton, The New Commerical Policy Instrument and Akzo v. DuPont, 13 EUR. L.
REv. 3 (1988); Litowitz, European Community Regulation No. 2641/84. A New Challenge to
US. International Trade Commission's Section 337, INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. REP. 3 (1986).
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cask under bond, and tax was paid on that basis. Only after the tax
was assessed was the liquid diluted and bottled for retail sale. Import-
ers, however, preferred to import the whisky bottled at their home
place of production, and the tax was assessed at the time of importa-
tion at the wine gallon rate, thus effectively costing more per retail
bottle. The importer could import the concentrated beverage, but then
could not advertise "bottled in Scotland." Also the bottling process
might be more expensive in the U.S.
In several interesting cases, 2' foreign producers challenged this
U.S. tax law as a violation of certain bilateral treaties. Since the U.S.
law was "grandfathered" under GATT, the GATT language was not
directly involved. 22 A U.S. court held that, since the tax law applied
equally to domestic and imported products, the national treatment
clauses of the treaty was not violated. However, that clause did not
have the language found in GATT Article III paragraph 1 prohibiting
taxes arranged "so as to afford protection." Partly because of this lan-
guage, under the GATT it can be strongly argued that even though a
tax (or regulation) appears on its face to be non-discriminatory, if it
has an effect of affording protection, and this effect is not essential to
the valid regulatory purpose (as suggested in Article XX), then such
tax or regulation is inconsistent with GATT obligations.
This brings to mind a number of hypothetical or not-so-hypotheti-
cal measures. One type of taxing proposal that has been considered is
structured as follows. A uniform "excise" or sales tax (or value added
tax) is imposed on the sale of a product (e.g., automobiles) whether
domestic or imported. Then the company paying this tax is allowed to
credit the amount paid against U.S. employment taxes it would other-
wise have paid on behalf of its employees (such as social security
taxes). Again, on its face, the provision appears neutral. Only when
we learn that importers have very little liability for U.S. employment
taxes, and thus have little opportunity to use these "credits," do we see
that the effect can be essentially discriminatory. 23
As another example, suppose a nation's tax laws provide for accel-
erated depreciation deduction allowances for capital purchases when
21. See Schieffelin & Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1396 (1970); Bercut-Vandervoort & Co.
v. United States, 46 C.C.P.A. 28, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959); see also J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY supra note 5, § 8.2(b).
22. In Schieffelin, the treaties involved were the Ireland-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation of 1950, and the British-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation of 1815. The Customs Court had accepted that the British imports were entitled under
the MFN clause in the British treaty to whatever tax treatment was required with respect to
imports of Irish origin.
23. As observed by the author.
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the materials or machinery purchased are produced domestically, but
not when they are imported. It appears clear that this is even explicit
discrimination. But suppose the law instead provides that the deduc-
tion is allowed only when the goods are made by persons who are paid
more than an average of $25,000 per year. Again, it is clear that this is
not a very well disguised discrimination. The GATT obligation does
not allow for differential treatment based on characteristics of the pro-
duction process,. rather than the product itself.24
A more subtle case is where a regulation for standardization or
safety is used to effectively discriminate against imports.25
IV. BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS
One of the more perplexing trade policy problems, related to the
national treatment obligation but also to several other GATT obliga-
tions, is the subject of "border tax adjustments" ("BTAs"). Under
GATT, a nation may charge upon importation a tax (in addition to
other tariffs) equivalent to a like internal tax imposed on domestic
products of the same type. As to trade in the opposite direction (i.e.,
exports) a nation is allowed to rebate the amount of any internal tax
imposed on the exported goods. Thus, in theory, the goods travel in
international trade "untaxed," and are taxed at their destination under
whatever rules apply there to domestic goods as well as imported. It
sounds equitable and reasonable, but these measures have been the
source of considerable acrimony in international trade relations, and
were considered by the United States Supreme Court in one of the few
cases in which the Court has ever entertained an international trade
issue.26
First, it is useful to examine the legal structure of GATT which
provides for the measures described in the preceding paragraph. The
language calling for this treatment is sprinkled through a number of
GATT clauses. On the import side, Article II, paragraph 2(a), grants
an exception from the rule limiting border charges to the amount of
the scheduled tariff binding, for "a charge equivalent to an internal tax
24. See Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales), Report of the Panel, GATT,
BISD, 1 Supp. 59 (1953). Belgian law imposed a charge on foreign goods purchased by public
bodies when these goods originated in a country whose system of family allowances did not meet
certain requirements. The Panel noted that this discrimination was inconsistent with the provi-
sions of Article I "and possibly with those of Article III, paragraph 2." See R. HUDEC, supra
note 8, ch. 13.
25. For a discussion of this situation, see infra section V. TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND THE
TOKYO ROUND CODE.
26. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978); see also J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY supra note 5, 140-42.
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imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III
." It is important to note that both Article III, and the remainder
of this language of Article II, refers to taxes on products.
On the export side, matters are a bit more complex. An interpreta-
tive note27 to Article XVI paragraph 4 states that a rebate of internal
taxes on products shall not be considered a "subsidy" for purposes of
the obligation against export subsidies. In addition, a clause in Article
VI likewise states that such a product tax rebate shall not be the basis
of either an anti-dumping duty nor a countervailing duty in the coun-
try of import. Again one can note that the taxes involved are those on
products.
These product taxes (such as a sales tax, excise tax, or tax on a
product at each stage of production) are often called "indirect taxes"
to contrast them from income or corporate taxes or other taxes im-
posed on a firm (not a product). The latter are, thus, often termed
"direct taxes." Although an argument might possibly be made to the
contrary, the value added taxes, such as those used in the European
Community, have for a long time been considered in GATT to be "in-
direct" (i.e., taxes on products) and thus eligible for border tax adjust-
ment treatment. Since these taxes are often as much as 20 percent or
more, this obviously has considerable potential effect on imports and
exports when border adjustments are applied.
In countries which do not generally have significant "product
taxes" but instead rely much more heavily on income taxes for their
revenue (as the United States does), border tax adjustments are either
not used or are relatively insignificant. Income or "direct" taxes are
not eligible for border tax adjustment, and this has been the source of
considerable criticism by United States political and business leaders
who see this disparity of treatment as unfair to their country.28 What
is (or was) the rationale for this special approach of GATT towards
border tax adjustments? At the time these rules were drafted, there
probably was not too much thought given to their potential impact in
27. See GATT Annex I, Ad Art. XVI, GATT, BISD vol. 4 (1969):
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when
destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not
in exceis of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
28. For example, section 1101(b) (16) of the 1988 Trade Act (Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418) states that a principal negotiating objective of the United
States in the Uruguay Round regarding border taxes is:
to obtain a revision of the GATT with respect to the treatment of border adjustments for
internal taxes to redress the disadvantages to countries relying primarily for revenue on
direct taxes rather than indirect taxes.
See also EXECUTIVE BRANCH FOR SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., IST SEss., TAX
ADJUSTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: GATT PROVISIONS AND EEC PRACTICES 1.
(Comm. Print 1973).
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the future, since at that time tariffs themselves were relatively much
more important. The BTA question, like so many others involving
non-tariff measures, was in early GATT years not the focus of much
attention. As tariffs declined, however, these alternative methods of
affecting trade flows have become much more significant.
One theory supporting the BTA system is that taxes on products
(indirect taxes) tend to be effectively borne by the purchaser or con-
sumer of those products. It is thus said that such a tax burden is
"shifted forward" to the purchaser or is a "destination" approach. In
contrast, it was thought that income or "direct" taxes were born pri-
marily by the suppliers of capital investment (i.e., are shifted "back-
ward") or are "origin" based. Thus it seemed fair to impose the
product taxes at the destination on a basis equal to that imposed there
on like domestic products. Certainly domestic producers in the coun-
try of import would perceive unfairness if the imported products were
not taxed equally to their products.
To leave the products subject to the product taxes of the exporting
country, however, would mean that products moving in international
trade would be double-taxed - once at the place of production and
again at the place of purchase or consumption. Thus it was felt neces-
sary to exclude the products from the product taxes of the exporting
countries by allowing a rebate of those taxes if necessary.
The problem, as any economist can demonstrate, is that both types
of taxes have some burden on both the purchaser and the provider of
capital, depending often on particular characteristics of the market
structure. For example, if competition is keen, a product tax may
mean that a producer will find it necessary to charge less than other-
wise (to partly offset the tax effect on purchasing demand). In such a
case, profitability will be lowered, and thus the return to capital is less
- i.e., investors bear part of the burden of the tax. Likewise, an in-
come tax affects the net after-tax return to capital and induces (if the
market permits) the producer to charge a higher price to purchasers so
as to offset the income tax effect on net profit. Thus the purchaser
bears part of the burden of the income tax. There is no simple way to
find the dividing line or to know the percentage of each type of tax
borne by the various participants for any particular product. The divi-
sion probably differs from product to product.2 9 Some economic com-
29. See generally, Penner, Uncertainty and the Short-Run Shifting of the Corporate Tax, 19
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 99 (1967); J. BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE U.S. COR-
PORATION INCOME TAX (1980); Goulder, Shoven & Whalley, Domestic Tax Policy and the For-
eign Sector Formulations to Result from a General Equilibrium Tax Analysis Model, in
BEHAVIORAL SIMULATION METHODS IN TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 333-64 (Feldstein ed. 1983); 0.
BROWNLEE, TAXING THE INCOME FORM U.S. CORPORATION INVESTMENTS ABROAD (1980);
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ment suggests that even for a corporate tax up to 20% of the burden is
shifted forward to the consumer in the short run, and as much as 60-
75% will be shifted forward eventually. Good evidence of this (if it
exists) would provide substantial arguments that income taxes should
receive some border tax adjustment treatment also. Without such
treatment for income taxes, those countries which depend much more
on such taxes argue that goods from countries with substantial border
tax rebates have not shouldered their share of the costs of government,
and therefore are in essence subsidized.
How can this problem be resolved? There seems to be no good
way. First of all, it is very unlikely that the GATT will be changed.
Even if it could be changed, it is hard to state a rule that would be
more accurate. Perhaps the present rule is as good a rough approxi-
mation of equity as can be found, and it is at least administrable. In a
floating exchange rate world, at least where the product taxes are gen-
erally uniformly applied to all products, it can be argued that the ex-
change rate adjusts to any border tax adjustment so that over a few
years (at least), most distortion effects of the BTA are neutralized.
Another approach for the "income tax" nations is to shift to a value
added or product tax for a much larger portion of revenue and then to
utilize a border tax adjustment. To change an otherwise desirable tax
system to try to achieve some uncertain and perhaps dubious advan-
tage for the international trade seems much like the "tail wagging the
dog." However, if such a product tax system has other merit to com-
mend it, it does not hurt that a by-product might be some less concern
about perceptions of unfairness of the international trade rules.30
The issue of "pass-through" of indirect taxes was raised in a recent
case before the Court of International Trade31 in which a U.S. pro-
ducer challenged, inter alia, the assumption of the Commerce Depart-
ment that an indirect tax would be completely passed through to the
eventual purchaser. Commerce argued that it knew of "no reasonable
method" for accurately measuring the incidence of a tax. The C.I.T.
rejected this approach stating that "a conclusion that full pass through
occurred in all cases is not supported by substantial evidence" and
remanded back to Commerce. In a later administrative review 32,
D. KAHN & P. GANN, CORPORATE TAXATION AND TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PART-
NERS (2d ed. 1985).
30. See J. WHALLEY, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AMONG MAJOR WORLD TRADING PART-
NERS (1985); Fullerton, Henderson & Shoven, A Comparison of Methodologies in Empirical Gen-
eral Equilibrium Models of Taxation, in APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS (1984).
31. Zenith Electronics Corporation v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1385 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986).
32. Television Receivers from Japan; Final Results of an Anti-dumping Duty Administrative
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Commerce continued to work on the assumption that full pass
through occurred, and stated that the government was considering an
appeal against the decision of the C.I.T. However, as neither side
wished to proceed any further, the case was never brought.
V. TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND THE TOKYO ROUND CODE
Implicit discrimination against imports is often found in the con-
text of so-called "product standards." Examples are numerous. A na-
tion which utilizes metric measures for tools and small fasteners might
require all such products to be marked in metric measures. There may
be a valid domestic consumer protection policy supporting such a re-
quirement, but it might also be introduced because troublesome im-
port competition stems from products which are marked in other
measures, such as inches or feet. 33 Likewise, in one case it was said
that a Pacific-Rim nation required packages of food products to be in
its own language and no other. While there seems to be ample policy
grounds to require the labels to have the language of the country of
import, to require that no other language occur on the label is to pre-
vent the use of a cost-saving multi-lingual label.
Sometimes it is alleged that agencies or industry groups which set
standards consciously try to "gerrymander" those standards to make
it comparatively more difficult for foreign producers to comply. In
such a way a market for electronic components might be protected for
domestic producers by certain quality or standards specifications.
Likewise drug or cosmetic standards might be "shaped" to allow do-
mestic manufacturers to accommodate them easily.
The process of obtaining clearance of a product subject to inspec-
Review, 53 Fed. Reg. 4050 (1988). It should also be noted that in another case (Atcor Inc. v.
United States, 658 F. Supp. 295, 302 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987)), and under slightly different circum-
stances, Judge Carman upheld a full adjustment for indirect taxes because of "congressional
intent that dumping margins not arise merely because taxes are collected on home market sales
but not on export sales." In so ruling, Judge Carman completely disregarded Watson's reasoning
in Zenith, supra note 31.
33. The following are some examples:
a) The French requirement that French inspectors inspect the source factory of any pharma-
ceutical sold in France, combined with the fact that French inspectors do not travel abroad. See
20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 953 (1984).
b) Belgian rules that margarine in Belgium must be sold in cubes, and not in oblong sticks, as in
the rest of the Common Market. See, e.g., Lebensmittel v. De Smedt PvbA, 1982 E. COMM. CT.
J. REP. 3961, 2 COMMON MKT. L.R. 496 (1983).
c) German requirements that prevent importation of non-fizzy mineral water on the basis that
such mineral water, as opposed to fizzy mineral water, does not help kill bacteria. See How the
EEC Could Still Have a Future, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 1984, at 29.
d) Pre-1983 Japanese practice of requiring "lot" or "unit" approval for imported products,
while allowing "type" approval for Japanese-produced products. See J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M.
MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND 110 (1984).
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tion for health or safety reasons may also add enough of a burden to
the importation of goods as to "afford protection" to domestic manu-
facturers. Even though the country of export may test and examine
goods which are exported, the importing country might require this to
be done again. In some cases it may have good reason to do this. The
exporting nation's tests may be unreliable or may not require as high a
standard as that of the importing nation. If the exporting nation's
tests are specifically for exports (and not domestically consumed prod-
ucts also), that nation may not have a strong incentive to provide
stringent testing, in contrast to the nation whose consumers will
purchase the good. On the other hand, delay and costs of processing
tests in the importing nation, whether due to under-staffing of the test-
ing agency, or a tacit understanding by that agency that "slowness
helps the balance of trade," clearly goes contrary to the liberal trading
policies of the international system.
Much of the controversy and, indeed, anger about Japan's appar-
ent unwillingness to import centers on practices such as those just
mentioned. The Japanese government has responded with various
programs designed to prevent such measures from inhibiting imports
and to mute the criticism leveled at Japan for these measures. 34
Because of the risk that these various problems will become in-
creasing sources of protectionism and of conflict, the GATT Con-
tracting Parties negotiated in the Tokyo Round a new code designed
to address these questions. This "Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade" 35 essentially reiterates the GATT Article III obligations,
stating,
Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and standards are not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to interna-
tional trade. Furthermore, products imported from the territory of any
Party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin and to like products originating in any
other country in relation to such technical regulations or standards.
They shall likewise ensure that neither technical regulations nor stan-
34. See Weil & Glick, Japan - Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market Drawn
from US Corporate Experience, 11 LAW. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 845 (1979); see also Wineburg, The
Japanese Patent System: A Non-Tariff Barrier to Foreign Businesses?, 22 J. WORLD TRADE L. 11
(1988); Edelman, Japanese Product Standards as Non-tariff Trade Barriers: When Regulatory
Policy Becomes a Trade Issue, 24 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 389 (1988); J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M.
MATSUSHITA supra note 33, 107-15.
35. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT, BISD, 26 Supp. 8 (1980), T.I.A.S.
9616, 31 U.S.T. 405; see Middleton, The GATT Standards Code, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 201
(1980); Sweeney, Technical Analysis of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 179 (1980); Nusbaumer, The GATT Standards Code in Operation, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 542 (1984).
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dards themselves nor their application have the effect of creating unnec-
essary obstacles to international trade.
Beyond this general "national treatment" type obligation, there are
few substantive rules in this Tokyo Round code, but the agreement
specifies a number of obligations regarding the procedure by which
product standards are developed in each of the signatory nations.
Under the Code, governments must to the extent possible (recognizing
that many product standards are developed by non-government
groups) ensure that foreign nations and their producers with an inter-
est in exporting shall have the opportunity to be heard and to present
facts and arguments to standards making bodies during the formula-
tion of standards. In addition the Code calls for "transparency" of
standards - that is, adequate notice and opportunity to comply. It
urges the development of international standards and urges parties to
recognize testing which has been appropriately done in the country
exporting products.
Some consider this Code to be one of the more successful results of
the Tokyo Round since it has the largest number of acceptances of any
of the codes (33, including both developing and non-market econo-
mies).36 Its operation in practice, and the activity of its Committee of
Signatories, seems to have engendered satisfaction among govern-
ments and businesses. At least one dispute brought formally under
this Code's dispute settlement mechanism has been satisfactorily
resolved. 37
Our discussion here has centered on the standards for products
themselves. Another important problem is that of standards, relating
not to the product itself but to the manufacture or processing of the
products and their impact on the pollution of the environment and the
safety of workers.3
VI. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
The most important exception to the national treatment obligation
in GATT Article III itself is found in paragraph 8 relating to govern-
ment procurement. The language provides some interpretative diffi-
36. GATT Doc. L/6212 (1987) and additions (1987/88). The U.S. has implemented the
Code in Title IV of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-
39, Title IV, 93 Stat. 242, 19 USCA § 2531 (1980 and Supp. 1988).
37. See R. STERN, J. JACKSON & B. HOEKMAN, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND OPERATION OF THE TOKYO ROUND CODES 66-68 (1988). In the case involving metal bats
from the U.S., the U.S. claimed that Japanese "lot" inspection (supra note 32) of American
imports was discriminatory. A formal bilateral complaint was lodged in August 1982. In March
1983 the Japanese changed the law and permitted U.S. producers to obtain "type" approval. See
Edelman, supra note 34, 406-10.
38. See the author's forthcoming book (particularly § 9.4).
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culties39 but generally makes exempt from Article III national
treatment obligations the purchases by "governmental agencies of
products purchased for governmental purposes. . . ." Since the Article
I MFN obligation of GATT makes reference to the obligations of Ar-
ticle III, paragraphs 2 and 4, it may be argued that government pro-
curement is also an exception to MFN rules.40
Early preparatory drafts of the ITO charter and GATT would
have included government procurement in the discipline of those in-
struments. However, government negotiators objected, so the final
drafts included explicit exclusions.41 Apparently government procure-
ment was too closely tied to sovereignty to permit regulation at that
time. Since military procurement would have been exempted in any
event, the drafters worried that any attempt to draw lines between
exempt and included government procurement would be too difficult.
There are several important reasons why this exception had be-
come very troublesome by the 1970's. First, there had been some
trend of increasing the government sector of a number of economies,
so that in some nations over 40 percent of gross national product
would pass through government budgets.42 Where major industry sec-
tors, such as steel or utilities, were nationalized, an increasing amount
of economic activity was beyond the reach of the GATT rules. U.S.
manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment (such as turbines) saw
great exporting potential if foreign restrictions on government
purchases of imports could be softened. The problem of non-market
economies could potentially be even more troublesome in this regard.
A second important (and related) reason for concern was the diffi-
culty of finding an agreed definition of either "government agency" or
"governmental purposes." Nations have a wide variety of ideas as to
what is the appropriate sphere of government activity. In some coun-
tries it is automatically assumed that the government should own and
run railroads, telephone systems, all electricity generation, travel bu-
39. GATT, Art. 111:8, BISD vol. 4 (1969). For example, para. 8(a) used the phrase "prod-
ucts purchased for governmental purposes." The question of what is a "governmental purpose"
can be very troublesome indeed. See, for an American example, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board
of Commissioners, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
40. See the author's forthcoming book, ch. 6. But see E. MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REGULATION 213 (2d ed. 1986).
41. K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 199-200
(1970).
42. Id. at 199; J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 5, 522-23; Bourgeois, Tokyo Round
Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and EEC
Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L.R. 5 (1982) (for a European view); see International Sympo-
sium on Government Procurement, 20 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 415 (1987), 21 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1987).
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reaus, airlines, and many other activities which private enterprise con-
ducts elsewhere. Some countries have added to the list basic
"smokestack" industries including steel and coal as well as major re-
lated service sectors such as banking. Such an important exception
from the GATT trading rules would clearly diminish the liberalizing
effects of those rules.
Thus it was that another code which came out of the Tokyo Round
was the "Agreement on Government Procurement." This Code is in-
teresting because of the apparent far-reaching rules included in it. The
general rule is stated as in Article II, paragraph 1, as follows: 43
With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
government procurement covered by this Agreement, the Parties shall
provide immediately and unconditionally to the products and suppliers
of other Parties offering products originating within the customs territo-
ries (including free zones) of the Parties, treatment no less favourable
than: (a) that accorded to domestic products and suppliers; and (b) that
accorded to products and suppliers of any other Party.
The Code outlines detailed rules to implement this general princi-
ple, including rules governing the bidding procedures to be followed.
These regulate the type of technical specifications which can be re-
quired in bids: tendering procedures including public announcement,
qualification of bidders, time-limits, tender documents, etc. Foreign
bidders are entitled to obtain a statement of reasons why their bids
were rejected, and a dispute settlement mechanism is established to
follow through on complaints. Several cases have already been
processed through this procedure. 44
Although the Code requirements may seem far-reaching, the im-
portant limitation of the Code is that it only applies to the governmen-
tal "entities" on a list appended to the Code for each signatory. The
scheme has characteristics very similar to that of tariff bindings in
GATT. As part of a process of reciprocal negotiation among the Code
signers, each country specifies by name to which entities the Code ap-
plies. The basic goal of the draftsmen was to have the Code establish a
framework for truly effective discipline against governmental discrimi-
natory purchasing, recognizing that such stringent requirements
would make governments somewhat hesitant to include entities on
43. GATT, Agreement on Government Procurement, Art. 11:1, BISD, 26 Supp. 33, 35
(1980).
44. For example, the complaint of the U.S. against EC deductions of value-added tax in
calculating whether the contract value exceeds the threshold figure. See Panel Report on Value-
Added Tax and Threshold, GATT, BISD, 31 Supp. 247 (1985). A second dispute concerned a
French Code-covered entity's procurement of a substantial number of microcomputers with al-
legedly Code-inconsistent procedures. The U.S. has proposed establishment of a Working Party
to study the problem.
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their list. Once the Code came into existence, with reciprocal negoti-
ated lists of entities, later negotiations were contemplated for additions
of more entities to the list. Some later negotiations have been held, 45
and more are contemplated.
The scope and coverage of the Government Procurement Agree-
ment additionally depends on certain other clauses in it. Although it
explicitly applies (interestingly enough) to most "services incidental to
the supply of products," a minimum threshold for covered contracts
was set at "SDR 150,000."46 An exception was also provided for na-
tional security and, in a qualified way, for national measures to protect
public morals, order, safety, health, and similar goals.47
As of mid-1988, 13 nations have accepted this agreement, and it
has been reported that in 1983 over $38 billion worth of trade was
covered by it.4s Telecommunications has been a large issue in connec-
tion with the agreement, and this issue has figured prominently be-
tween the United States and Japan. In the U.S. telecommunications
has not been government owned, and even its monopoly power has
been diluted by the trend to "deregulation." Thus, the U.S. argues
that foreign suppliers have the opportunity to sell telecommunication
equipment in the U.S. market. On the other hand, most other nations
have a government-owned telecommunications monopoly, although
several have recently decided to "privatize" or deregulate also. From
the end of the Tokyo Round onward, the U.S. and Japan have negoti-
ated strenuously over U.S. demands that U.S. companies have better
opportunities to sell products to the Japanese telephone monopoly.
From the U.S. perspective, these negotiations have had only moderate
success. On the other hand, in at least one case, the Japanese demon-
strated that a U.S. telephone company, AT & T, refused a purchase of
Japanese equipment (which was the low bid in a competition) for
"Buy American" reasons.
49
45. See, e.g., GATT Panel Agrees on New Procurement Code to Widen Foreign Access in Con-
tract Bidding, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. 1427 (1986).
46. SDR 150,000 was approximately $149,000 in 1986. This threshhold amount has subse-
quently been lowered to SDR 130,000 (GATT, BISD 33 Supp. 190 (1987)), which for 1988 had a
dollar value of $156,000.
47. GATT, Agreement on Government Procurement, Art. VIII, BISD 26 Supp. 33 (1980).
48. GATT Doc. L/6212 (1987) and additions (1987-88). For the value-of-trade-covered
data, see GATT/GPR/W/38 (1983); GPR/W/57 (1984); GPR/24 (1984).
49. In 1981 Fujitsu submitted a bid to supply fiber optic cable to AT&T. When AT&T con-
sidered accepting the bid, which AT&T freely admitted was the lowest, Congressman Timothy
Wirth wrote to the FCC pointing out the national security implications of such a purchase. Wall
St. J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 26, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1981, at Dl, col. 6. AT&T later rejected
Fujitsu's bid and decided in favor of Western Electric, the manufacturing arm of AT&T. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1983, at D4, col. 5. However in 1982, MCI awarded a similar contract to
Fujitsu. Wall St. J., June 18, 1982, at 12, col. 3.
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In the United States, there are many "Buy American" regulations,
both at the federal and at the state level.50 A 1979 International Trade
Commission study5" found some twenty-five instances of regulatory
preferences for U.S. goods at the federal level alone. The United
States is not unique in requiring preferences for domestically-produced
goods. However, it is unusual in legislating such preferences. 52
The best example is the Buy American Act,53 which essentially
requires acquisition of domestically produced articles for "public use."
In an important exception, the law authorizes the federal authorities
to deviate from this rule if the cost of foreign-produced articles is
lower by specified amounts. 54
Although federal procurement policies now limit Buy American
provisions in order to open government markets in accordance with
the MTN Agreement, state Buy American statutes have proliferated
in recent years. Thirty-six states now have some form of Buy Ameri-
can legislation, compared with twenty-three a decade ago. Interest-
ingly enough, the United States was prepared to accept the Code as
applicable to governmental subdivisions, but other nations were ac-
tively opposed,55 so this remains an exception to the international
code.
50. On state "Buy American" acts, see L. GLICK, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
WORLD TRADE AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND 138 (1984).
51. MTN Studies No. 6, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 233, 265 (1979).
52. E. MCGOVERN, supra note 40, at 213-19.
53. Sections 1 to 3 of Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 212, tit. 3, 47 Stat. 1520, are commonly
known as the "Buy American" Act; see 41 USCA § 10a (1980 and Supp. 1988), 49 C.F.R. § 660,
48 Fed. Reg. 14899 (1983).
54. The President has set this cost difference at 6%. 48 C.F.R. § 25.105.
55. J. JACKSON, J. LOUIS & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 33, at 200-01.
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